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Abstract
While the unintended consequences of social action have exercised thesociological imagination since the discipline’s inception, sociology is yet tofully develop a systematic study of accidents and disasters. Leading figures inthe field criticise current work on accidents for being piecemeal and isolatedfrom mainstream sociology, for lacking theoretical innovation, for being blindto differential suffering and for being largely silent on questions of power. Thisarticle advances a case for an accidentology which will rectify these perceivedflaws. It also advocates accidentology on the basis that accidents are sociallypatterned, that they are understudied compared to other social problems, andthat they are increasing in scale, frequency and severity. In making thesearguments we also consider what the examination of accidents and disasterswill reveal.
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Resumen
Mientras que las consecuencias no deseadas de la acción social han ocupado laimaginación sociológica desde los inicios de la disciplina, la sociología aúntiene que desarrollar completamente un estudio sistemático de los accidentes ylos desastres. Entre las críticas más importantes que los principales autores enaccidentología realizan a la actual investigación sobre accidentes encontramosque se trata de estudios fragmentados y aislados respecto de la sociologíamayoritaria, que carece de innovación teórica por no prestar atención aldiferencial de sufrimiento y por las grandes lagunas respecto a temáticas depoder. Este artículo aporta un caso de accidentología que cubre tales carencias.Así mismo, aboga por una accidentología que parta de la base que losaccidentes están modelados socialmente, de que están infraestudiados respectode otros problemas sociales, y de que en los últimos años los desastres yaccidentes están aumentando en escala, frecuencia y severidad. Con estetrabajo, y partiendo de estas premisas, realizamos una contribución a señalar loque el examen de accidentes y desastres puede revelar.
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his article begins with the observation that sociology has a longhistory of studying the unintended or accidental consequences ofsocial actions but is paradoxically still to develop a solidsociological study of accidents. Current criticisms of the field are notedand reasons for systematically developing the sociology of accidentsand disasters (referred to here as accidentology) are offered. We look atwhat accidentology is likely to reveal, we consider the normality ofaccidents in our world and we criticise the notion of accidents of natureas natural disasters are always socially mediated. Following CharlesPerrow (1984, p. 64) this article defines accidents as unintended eventsthat damage people, materials and systems. Disasters are defined as bigaccidents, human and “natural” accidents that are large­scale, expensive,public, unexpected and traumatic (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997, p. 19).
Sociologists know that life does not always go as hoped. Modernexistence is beset by all manner of crises: economic, environmental,existential. They also know that life does not always go as planned.Indeed, the unintended consequences of purposive human action haveexercised the sociological imagination since the discipline’s inception.Sociology has even been positioned as the analysis of the unexpected(Portes, 2000). Robert K. Merton (1936, p. 894) remarked that everysocial theorist worthy of the name has engaged with this issue, whileKarl Popper (1963, p. 342) argued that it should be nothing less than thetheoretical social sciences’ primary task. Even if we restrict ourselves tothe discipline’s founding fathers we can think about Karl Marx’s workon the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, Max Weber’s writings on thegrowth of capitalism from Calvinist practices and Émile Durkheim’sobservations on how the pathological can emerge from the normal (andhow the pathological can be normal). Marx’s focus on dialectics and contradictions is seen to be evidence ofan interest in the unanticipated (Elster, 1985). There can be markeddifferences between individual actions and overall design. Individualshave desires, they act upon them and their aggregation determines theend result. In some instances, as with one of political economy's most
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Sociology and the Unintended
important laws – the tendency of the rate of profit to fall – the intentionsof individual actors to increase their profitability results in its veryantithesis. Increased investment in constant capital relative to labour(variable capital) may increase productivity but it will ultimately reduceprofitability as labour is the source of profit. Anything which reducessurplus labour time relative to overall production capital will impact onprofits. Jon Elster (1985, p. 48) thinks that Marx’s attention to theunintended collective consequences of individual actions ‘is [his]central contribution to the methodology of social science’. Wolfgang Schivelbusch (1986, pp. 132­133) interrogates the sourceof Marx’s interest in the unintended. He believes that it comes from oneof the traumatic phenomena of modernity: the technological accident.Marx then projected this back onto political economy, although agenuine materialist conception of history would need to pay account tothe exploitation of things as well as people. Pushed to extremesmaterials also show fatigue; boilers explode, locomotive axles snap. Innineteenth century thought the technological accident arose throughdisruption to the machine’s equilibrium, the relationship betweencontained energy and the method of containment. Marx, he says,similarly saw economic crisis as disturbance in the balance betweenpurchase and sale in the flow of commodities. Peter Berger (1968) observed that the unintended consequences ofhuman action were also a recurring motif in the work of Max Weber.Sociologists have long understood history as something more than thetriumph of collective will or the rule of great ideas. In The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber noted the linkages betweenreligious and economic practice. Calvin’s doctrine of predestination ledpeople to act ascetically in all aspects of life, economic life especially.This, he argued, gave rise to the ethos of capitalism, something that thefounders of the Calvinist Reformation never envisaged: ‘In other words,Weber’s work … gives us a vivid picture of the irony of human actions’(Berger, 1968, p. 52). In this case an economic system is the accident ofa religious denomination. Émile Durkheim (1965, p. 47­75) discusses normality and pathologyin The Rules ofSociological Method. Normal practices and phenomenaare generally distributed, pathological (or morbid) ones are not. In this
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work he stated that if anything is to be interpreted as pathological it issurely crime. This is the starting premise of Criminology (Durkheim,1965, p. 65). What is considered normal is often also that which isuseful or generally acceptable. Again, crime seems to oppose thesenotions. Yet Durkheim was able to argue that crime was both normaland unintentionally positive. Crime is found everywhere, in all societiesat all times. Moreover, Durkheim suggested, crime rates are increasing.‘There is, then, no phenomenon that presents more indisputably all thesymptoms of normality, since it appears closely connected with theconditions of all collective life’ (Durkheim, 1965, p. 66). This point ispushed further, with Durkheim suggesting that crime is an importantelement of a healthy society. Crime is normal as no society existswithout it, social complexity is such that we can never achieve universaluniformity. Moreover, crimes reaffirm collective sentiments regardingpublic morality and law. This makes crime both ‘necessary’ and ‘useful’(Durkheim, 1965, p. 70). Crime and deviance more generally also offeranother social good: the prospect of change. No value or practiceendures forever. Criminal acts test conventional boundaries. Strangely, while sociologists have always acknowledged accidentalevents they have yet to develop a systematic study of them. Leadingfigures in the field like Diane Vaughan (1999) and Kathleen Tierney(2007) criticise sociological work on accidents for being piecemeal andisolated from mainstream sociology, for lacking theoretical innovation,for being blind to differential suffering and for largely being silent onissues of power. As late as 2010 Tierney (2010, p. 661) could complainthat ‘political power still receives little emphasis’. In short, we await afully­blown “accidentology” (Virilio, 2007, p. 10).
Aside from rectifying the problems that Vaughan and Tierney haveidentified, why might we want an accidentology? Three arguments canbe advanced. First, all of the available evidence suggests that accidentsare increasing in their scale, frequency and severity (Klein, 2007, p.415). Wolfgang Kröger (2005) of the International Risk GovernanceCouncil notes their massive growth over recent years. This has resulted
Matthewman - Accidentology197
Why do we need an Accidentology?
in almost half a million deaths, with a further 2.5 billion individualsadversely affected. In addition to the staggering human costs, economiclosses from accidents were calculated at USD$690 billion. Kröger’sargument squares with that of the Swiss reinsurance industry (Bevere,Rogers & Grollimund, 2011), and also with well known “disasterscholars” like Charles Perrow. In The Next Catastrophe Perrow (2007,p. 1) wrote: ‘Disasters from natural sources, from industrial andtechnological sources and from deliberate sources such as terrorismhave all increased in the United States in recent decades and nodiminution is in sight’. Indeed, writes Ulrich Beck (1992, p. 52), wenow inhabit a risk society in which ‘the unknown and unintendedconsequences come to be the dominant force in history and in society’.Increasing levels of interconnection and interdependence increase ourvulnerability. For example, the first automobile plant to ceasemanufacturing following the Fukushima disaster was a General Motorstruck plant in Louisiana (Bunkley, 2011). Second, although accidents are a significant social problem theirstudy remains underdeveloped relative to other social problems likesuicide. Yet figures from the early 1990s show that in England andWales accidents were responsible for more than double the deaths ofsuicides and they have been the leading cause of childhood fatalities forover a generation (Green, 1997, p. 6, 8). These sobering figures areunlikely to improve. Judith Green (1997, p. 8) makes the point that in anera of decreasing mortality in the West, child mortality especially,accidents will increasingly figure as the cause of death. The WorldHealth Organization shows us the bigger picture. It does not recordstatistics on accidents and suicides per se; rather it records unintentionaland intentional (self­inflicted) injuries. In 2002 unintentional injuriesaccounted for 6.2% of all global deaths, and self­inflicted intentionalinjuries accounted for 1.5% of all fatalities (World Health Organization,2004). The most recent WHO statistics pertain to 2008. In that year6.4% of global deaths were accidents (including road traffic accidents,drownings, falls and fires) and 1.4% were self­inflicted injuries (WorldHealth Organization, 2011).Significant those these findings are, if we expand our horizons toconsider large­scale disasters, the pan­European world appears as an
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enclave of privilege. In the three decades from 1963 over 90 per cent ofall major global disasters (measured by incidents that result in over 100deaths, damage of one per cent of GDP or that affect one per cent of thepopulation) took place outside of the western world (Smith, 1996, p. 3).Throughout the 1990s 96 per cent and 99 per cent of people killed oradversely affected by hazards lived outside of North America andEurope respectively (Walker & Walter, 2000, pp. 173­175). Typically,the Rest suffer far more than the West. This suggests that a properlydeveloped accidentology should be wary of theoretical pronouncementsregarding general conditions, for example Ulrich Beck’s (1992, p. 36;1999, p. 62) work on a generic global risk society in which hazards aredemocratised. After all, the available evidence suggests that there areclear and massively uneven geographies of risk (on this see Tierney,1999). If accidents and catastrophes were always unwilled and unanticipatedevents and if they randomly impacted upon society there would be littleroom for sociological intervention. However, from the late nineteenthcentury onward, sociologists have known that accidents are sociallypatterned. This gives us the third reason for sociological intervention.Durkheim (1979, p. 120) noted how accidents are influenced by seasonin temperate climates. Official statistics (Durkheim cited three years’worth from Italy) show an increase in accidents in summer, when socialactivity is at its peak. The next highest season for accidents is winter,which Durkheim said brings its own hazards, specifically the increasedlikelihood of falls. Research by sociologists of accidents has revealedother remarkably consistent patterns in which the isolated, weak andless wealthy consistently fare worse. As Mikael Elinder & OscarErixson (2012) showed in a study of maritime disasters affecting 15.000people across three centuries, even at sea women and children do notcome first. Men do not give priority to women, and crew do not givepriority to passengers. This social patterning applies to accidents ofnature like prolonged heat waves (Klinenberg, 2002) and severe storms(Squires & Hartman, 2006); it also applies to technological accidentslike car crashes, which are currently the fourth biggest killer of theworld’s 18­59 year olds. In this instance it is the young rather than theold, the populations of the global south rather than the north, the
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pedestrian rather than the driver that overwhelmingly pay the price(Roberts, 2003). According to the World Health Organisation’s (2009)
Violence and Injury Prevention and Disability (VIP) programme 90% ofall vehicle related deaths are in the developing world, the financial costsof which exceed what these nations receive in aid payments. Clearly risks are not generic. Vulnerable and marginalizedcommunities are structurally placed so that the chances of them livingthrough and dying from accidental encounters are greatly magnified.This social fact is a call for a more purposive, as opposed to accidental,engagement with them. There is, for example, an entire literature onenvironmental justice, which looks at the siting of toxic waste dumps(Mohai 1995; 2008). In the United States of America race appears to be
the determining factor in terms of chemical hazard exposure (Bullard,1998). For accidentology to have any purchase, then, it must alsodevelop a nuanced victimology.
Our survey thus far has suggested that accidents are very much part ofthe modern condition, a source of significant (and growing) physicalinsecurity and of existential angst. They are syndromes of our times. Onthis basis alone they demand the attention of social theorists who aretasked with making sense of the present. But there is an additionalreason for considering the accident. Accidents afford us insights intosocial reality that ordinarily pass unnoticed. Thinkers of variouspersuasions have long held that the truth only reveals itself in thesemoments of rupture. For this reason Paul Virilio has called the accident‘a profane miracle’ (Lotringer & Virilio, 2005, p. 63). What it primarilyreveals for him is the substance of technology and the underside ofprogress. Discovery begets catastrophe. Each technology is also theinvention of a specific accident. The ship begets the shipwreck, therailway the collision and derailment. Bruno Latour (2005, p. 81) offers asimilar argument. The sudden malfunction of technological accidentprovides a rare moment of visibility in which the agency of objects isfinally exposed. The stubborn refusal of something to workautomatically (which usually means invisibly) gives us occasion to think
International andMultidisciplinary Journal ofSocial Sciences 1(2) 200
What will Accidentology Reveal?
about what it actually makes possible. Other thinkers have argued thataccidents reveal yet more, the workings of the world of politics. In a classic 1970 publication Harvey Molotch (1970, p. 143)advocated the accident as methodology. They provide windows into theworkings of the powerful that are normally obscured to us. His casestudy was of an accidental oil spill off the Californian coast. Upsetlocals should have been in a strong position to take the fight to StandardOil when crude leaked from Platform A into the Santa Barbara Channel.Santa Barbara is populated by people with an abundance of cultural andfinancial capital. It is a town full of elite people with good connections.Yet these resources proved all too meagre in the face of Big Oil. Oil wasnot the only thing to ooze from the platform, as Molotch wrote, ‘a bit oftruth about power in America spilled out along with it’ (Molotch, 1970,p. 131). In the immediate aftermath, Interior, the US Geological Survey, theUS Navy and even the President himself, along with other major actors,lined up to support corporate power, making for a textbook case in ‘themobilization of bias’ (Molotch, 1970, p. 138). As Molotch observed, theoil industry provides the data that allows federal agencies to regulate itand it provides the university grants which allow academics to study it.Despite the protests of locals Interior refused to stop the drilling. TheUS Geological Survey accepted Union Oil’s definition of reality,assenting to their assessment of the size of the spill. Independent expertsoffered a figure ten times higher. These were dismissed. Dead wildlifewas also systematically undercounted by the authorities. The only deadto qualify were those that made it to the officially set up bird cleaningfacilities. (Molotch noted the inefficiency with which dead and dyingbirds move.) In a similar vein the US Navy disputed the observationsmade by marine biologists at the University of California Santa Barbaraand staff at the local natural history museum. They had both claimedthat large numbers of sea lion pups were dying. The Navy whichadministered the Channel Islands disputed this: in their opinion theanimals were merely sleeping not dying. Finally, the world’s mostpowerful man, President Richard Nixon, was flown in by helicopter toprovides a rare moment of visibility in which the agency of objects isfinally exposed. The stubborn refusal of something to work
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automatically (which usually means invisibly) gives us occasion to thinkprovides a rare moment of visibility in which the agency of objects isfinally exposed. The stubborn refusal of something to workautomatically (which usually means invisibly) gives us occasion to think More recently Frank Trentmann has also argued that accidents openup everyday life’s politics. He writes: ‘A power failure, a water shortageor a public transport system breaking down can raise questions aboutaccountability (who is to blame), entitlement and social justice (whoshould get what) and, most profoundly, about “normality” (how can orshould members of a society live)’, he therefore argues that,‘[d]isruption … is a particularly useful way to explore connectionsbetween practices, politics and socio­technical systems’ (Trentmann,2009, p. 69). Molotch and Trentmann give us some ways to think about the politicsof accidents: accidents rupture the order of things, they give us detailsthat the powerful would prefer to hide. In this view accidents present thepowerful with problems. But it would seem that there is more to thepolitics of accidents than this. Surely the reverse can also apply:accidents can provide the powerful with opportunities. The earliestsociology alerts us to the politics of accidents. For example Durkheim’sclassic study on suicide noted that things may be counted as accidents inofficial statistics when they are not. Suicides by vehicle, Durkheim(1979, p. 18) wrote, are mostly coded as accidents. This is a way ofavoiding moral opprobrium. The powerful may also invoke accidentsfor precisely the same reason: to avoid condemnation and to explainaway events that they would otherwise have to take some responsibilityfor. Such an argument has been made regarding President BarackObama’s June 15, 2010 address to the public from the Oval Office:
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Good evening. As we speak, our nation faces a multitude ofchallenges. At home, our top priority is to recover and rebuild froma recession that has touched the lives of nearly every American.Abroad, our brave men and women in uniform are taking the fight toal Qaida wherever it exists. And tonight, I’ve returned from a trip tothe Gulf Coast to speak with you about the battle we’re wagingagainst an oil spill that is assaulting our shores and our citizens(Obama, 2010a, para.1).
David Bromwich (2010, p. 5) noted the political machinations at workhere: an environmental disaster, a human one and a financial one are allgiven the same ontological status; moreover they are all presented asunpredictable and uncontrollable accidents. No one is responsible forthem, no one is to blame. ‘But’, as Bromwich (2010, p. 5) notes, ‘thewars were caused by Cheney and Bush, the collapse ... by the profiteersof the mortgage bubble and their trading partners, and the oil spill by thecorporate malfeasance of an unregulated oil giant.’
Deepwater Horizon was something of a personal embarrassment forObama. Only 2 weeks prior to the world’s biggest ocean oil leak he hadsaid the following: "It turns out, by the way, that oil rigs today generallydon’t cause spills. They are technologically very advanced" (Obama,2010b, para. 49). (The same speech also praised Japan’s safe and securenuclear energy.) This serves as a reminder of the complexity of modernsocio­technical systems. They are not necessarily understood by anyone.Bryan Wynne (1988, p. 149) suggests that we think of them ‘as a formof large­scale “real­time” experiment’ which enmeshes us all. Or simplyput, as accidents waiting to happen. Wynne builds an empirical base forthis conclusion from numerous sources. He considers several casesincluding the Challenger space shuttle disaster and the handling ofhighly toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC), neither of which he takes to beexceptional. Wynne suggests that experts work under greater ambiguitythan is ordinarily supposed, particularly when they are involved withmulti­sited systems. For him the bulk of our technologies are preciselythese complex interlinked systems (they are “extensive” and “open­textured” in his terminology). It is commonly believed that we have rules and then practices, butWynne refutes the idea that we normally have a system in whichdevices, power sources and people operate with a shared logic ofrational, rule­bound behaviour. Gaps exist between technology in theory(design and rational planning: what it should do) and technology inpractice (use and emergent rule­making: what it actually does). Thelatter is never a final accomplishment; it always remains an ongoing
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process. These practices of contextualisation and informal ruledevelopment impact upon the technology, complicating notions of risk.As Wynne sees it, technologies are “normalised” through unanticipateddevelopments. Accidents, then, bring normal technology into question. In the case of the Challenger space shuttle, NASA was fully awarethat some components and subsystems were not in proper workingorder. This had been the case with previous missions, none of whichcame to a catastrophic end. The Challenger explosion was caused byleaking O­ring seals on the solid rocket boosters. Earlier launchesdemonstrated thermal stressing of the O­rings and leak paths in thesurrounding insulation. It was widely agreed that the O­rings had neverperformed as they should. They were frequently burned or broken, andthey were liable to leak. They were acceptable as opposed to optimal.This was but one component not working to script. The result was thatnotions of safety shifted. What was taken to be safe was negotiatedinformally in­house. Observable failures were a matter of ongoingdebate, but it was agreed (wrongly in retrospect) that all failures werewithin acceptable limits. Wynne identifies three elements of technological normalization:institutional, contextual and systemic. First, as the work oforganizational sociologists has demonstrated, organizations developworking routines and rules that are frequently at odds with officialorganizational norms. The NASA Challenger example is pertinent here.Second, technologies work in concrete and complex circumstances,including ones for which they were never designed. Japan’s nuclearpower plants are a case in point. Most reactors are American designed.They were not created with earthquakes and tsunamis in mind (Sawadacited in Jamail, 2011). Slippage can occur between various contexts ofuse as technologies are adapted for local conditions. Third, slippage isexacerbated in the case of large­scale systems where contextualizationmay only be partial, for example, parts are absorbed (or are not) into thelocal regulatory structures fragmenting the overall operating system.When there are cross­cutting rationalities the potential exists for yetfurther problems. Wynne cites the case of a French factory that wasstoring and distributing MIC, the chemical responsible for thousands ofdeaths in Bhopal when it leaked from a Union Carbide plant. Regardedas one of the world’s worst industrial disasters, stringent safety
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procedures for dealing with the chemical were introduced in itsaftermath. While the factory was exercising due care, at another point inthe socio­technical system (the port in Marseilles) the MIC was beingprocessed as if it were any other substance. Dockworkers, used tostandardised productivity­based pay, were unloading it at as fast aspossible when extreme care was required. The classic exposition of this position comes from Charles Perrowwho argues that many of today’s calamities are nothing other than theroutine outcomes of our complex, tightly­coupled, and ultimatelyunmanageable, technological arrangements. To use his word, they arenormal. Accidents are to be expected in complex hi­tech assemblages.This is because the potential exists for failures within the system tointeract with each other in unanticipated and often incomprehensibleways. These will be particularly devastating in “tightly coupled”systems where processes are rapid, intimately linked and hard to stop.Such accidents are the outcome of several failures in processes,planning, personnel, procurement, technologies, materials andenvironment. The lesson Perrow (1984, p. 64) draws from all of this isthat we should modify our management of systems where the risksmight be acceptable (where possible looking to forge “loose couplings”)and abandon systems where the consequences of accidents are too great(nuclear power, for example). Perrow’s arguments are derived from a number of case studies,including the partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island’s Unit 2nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. Initially the plant’s operators werevilified. Blaming workers seems to have a long pedigree in capitalistindustry. In volume one of Capital Karl Marx (1990, p. 363­365) wroteof three London railway workers who found themselves in the dockfollowing a major passenger train accident which resulted in numerousfatalities. The jury were told that the workers’ days stretched anywherebetween 14 and 20 hours, but could be triple that during peak times.Fatigue inevitably led to errors. All the same, they were charged withmanslaughter. Marx also wrote of firemen and factory employees whofound themselves in mortal danger from accidents due to working shiftsthat exceeded 24 hours. There can be no doubting Perrow’s (2007)political sympathies here, which clearly align with Marx. His follow­up
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book contains the chapter: “Are Terrorists as Dangerous asManagement?” In the case of the Three Mile Island plant it would emerge that themaintenance team were understaffed and overworked, but subsequentinvestigation showed systemic failures: pumps failed, valves were in thewrong position, a warning light was covered over on an instrumentpanel, an ASD (automatic safety device) and its indicator failed, as did aPORV (pilot operated relief valve), none of which the plant’s operatorscould have been aware of. Well after the fact the experts still debatedwhether or not the workers should have cut back on the HPI (highpressure injection) which forces water into the reactor core, or whetheror not hydrogen bubbles could have formed in the overheated fuel rodspresenting the possibility of explosion (Perrow, 1984, p. 17­29). For Kai T. Erikson the events at Three Mile Island provide aparadigm case. Modern risks associated with toxins constitute ‘adifferent species of trouble’ (Erikson, 1995, p. 17) whose ramificationsare psychological, physiological and sociological. They differ in termsof the damage they do and the legacy they leave. Poisons create theirown peculiar fears. Individuals and communities find contamination bythem more frightening than the damage done by natural hazards ormachine­related accidents. They are upset by them in entirely novelways. This occurs for a number of reasons. Toxic disasters haveundefined lifecycles. They do not simply begin, exist and then end.Their duration is not obvious and their effects are deferred. This createsthe conditions for a perpetual state of fear. No one knows how muchradiation was accidentally released from the reactor or the real harm thatit did, thus ‘the feeling generated there was pure dread, perfect dread,the very essence of dread’ (Erikson, 1995, p. 140). Such fear isintensified as these threats typically evade bodily protectionmechanisms: our senses. We do not know when we are at risk. Ill­defined, imperceptible and therefore difficult to counter, communitiestend to display profound feelings of inadequacy at being so out ofcontrol. The poison seems to exert agency. People become passive,putting their lives on hold. This leads to a final difference between toxicevents and older forms of risk: the former weaken social bonds whereas“traditional” disasters tend to strengthen them (Wolfenstein, 1957;Barton, 1969). To summarise, these events are unbounded, less likely to
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observe the spatial and temporal limits of other disasters, they are alsouncanny. These risks are disembodied, unsettling and socially corrosive.Moreover, this new species of trouble is on the rise, ‘becoming one ofthe social and psychological signatures of our times’ (Erikson, 1995, p.240).
Just as we may need to dispense with the traditional temporality ofaccident research – that they have a discernible beginning, middle andend – we may also need to dispense with another idea, that there is sucha thing as a natural disaster. Distinctions between “external” accidentsof nature and “internal” technological accidents are increasinglydifficult to sustain. After all, natural disasters are simultaneouslysociotechnical events. As Scott Huler (2011) blogged of the March 2011earthquake off Japan’s Tōhoku coast which created a tsunami whichcame ashore to disastrous consequence:
 To anyone that followed the media at the time it readily becameapparent that discussion about the destructive wave that smashed intothe Tōhoku coast was soon eclipsed by heated debate about theplacement of coastal communities, rural­urban drift, the fragility ofsupply chains, long­term food security, safe energy provision, suitable
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The tsunami spent about an hour as a natural disaster, then a fewdays as an issue of emergency response. But the long term, thesituation emerged as a pure crisis of infrastructure. Recall thatJapan was already coping with the problems created by trying torun itself without the Fukishima plant. This was made even morecomplex by Japan’s use of both 50­hertz and 60­hertz electricalgrids, caused because Japan never adopted either the NorthAmerican (60­hertz) or European (50­hertz) electrical standards.Let’s not even bring up how the most serious problems were causedby decades of failure to create a long­term solution for radioactivewaste, or the possibilities of thorium power generation. The pointis, you start with an earthquake and a tsunami, and a cup of coffeelater you’re talking about generating electricity with rare­earth minetailings (Huler, 2011, para. 5).
infrastructure, the role of the media and the transparency of Japanesepolitics (Sand, 2011, pp. 34­35; Perrow, 2011; Huler, 2011; Watts,2011). Designating something an accident or a natural disaster may alsoblind us to the structural violence of social systems (Soron, 2007).Consider Hurricane Katrina. Certainly a great part of that disaster wascaused by the awesome power of nature. No one can accuse America’spolitical masters of conjuring a Category Five hurricane. The powerelite were not responsible for the build­up of low air pressure whichcaused the tropical wave or the warm core storm system that is thetropical cyclone. Nor were they accountable for the warm watertemperatures of the Loop Current in the Gulf of Mexico, the low windshear, or the anticyclone in the troposphere which all helped fuel it.They did not decide where Katrina would come ashore, but they didknow what the consequences of a storm surge from the strong winds,heavy rains and high waves would be for the city of New Orleans.Moreover, a string of political decisions intensified Katrina’sdevastating impact. Increasing knowledge of the scale of the potential risk was met byactual reductions in public expenditures by federal, state and cityauthorities to counter it. There were no contingency plans to evacuatethe helpless. In an ominous prequel to Katrina the poorest sector of thepopulation were left behind when Hurricane Ivan struck in September2004. Administrative negligence was manifest in both the failure toupkeep levees and to improve them in the knowledge that the currentdefences were inadequate. Not that all were equal before the elements.Some were protected better than others. The levee system contiguouswith the Mississippi river varied in height and maintenance levels. Thiswas indexed to the value of the land and the people behind them. Themost vulnerable populations were the poor of the Upper and LowerNinth Wards, particularly the African American poor who had alreadybeen condemned to years of systematic neglect. Such people weresurplus to requirements. It was hoped that they would go elsewhereleaving the Big Easy a Disneyfied version of its former self to beenjoyed by tourists and endured by a small retinue of service workers(Davis, 2005). 
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This accident of nature could only be as disastrous as it was becauseof a series of conscious political decisions, including calamitousexercises in the outsourcing of essential services to private contractorsbefore and after the event, and the massive engineering project whichcreated the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) for commercialshipping. MRGO constituted a manufactured hazard. A 75 mile ditchthat connects the city to the Gulf, its construction killed off salt­sensitivevegetation that had helped to protect the city. Tens of thousands of acresof wetlands were destroyed. Moreover MRGO effectively made for a“hurricane highway” allowing floodwater to inundate the city(Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson, 2008, p. 1026). A hurricanewas unavoidable. A humanitarian disaster was not. In consequenceKatrina can be seen as a ‘socially mediated’ storm (Žižek, 2008, p. 80),the ‘deadly combination of weathered public infrastructure and extremeweather’ (Klein, 2007, p. 415). Accidents and natural disasters also provide the powerful withlucrative opportunities. Massive private profits can be made from publicpain. Naomi Klein (2007) documents this, tracing the post­9/11 securityboom in which a slew of state services have been outsourced tocorporate contractors. Milton Friedman’s work gives this movement itsideological drive. This advances capital and corporate power at theexpense of organised labour. It stresses privatization, deregulation andwholesale reductions in state spending. Catastrophes present marketopportunities. Accidents, natural disasters, wars and political upheavalsprovide the material conditions for these neo­liberal ideas to take hold.The social dislocation and disorientation that accompanies collectiveshock creates the opportunity for intervention. Resistance is weak,people are desperate. Thus Sri Lankan fishing communities were tovacate their waterfront properties for hotel development following the2004 tsunami, just as the inhabitants of New Orleans were expected toforego public housing and schooling after Hurricane Katrina. Klein callsthis hyper­profitable shock therapy “disaster capitalism”. Other disasterresearchers have noted a pattern to the normal operation of capitalistdevelopment, citing MRGO as one of their examples. In this sensepower elites do not seize on disasters so much as they create them.MRGO was proposed in the name of economic development. When the“benefits” were analysed it emerged that the costs of the public works
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were democratised, the financial benefits concentrated and the true riskshidden (Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson, 2008).
This article has advanced an argument for developing the sociology ofaccidents and disasters. It has done so on the basis of criticismsregarding current research, that the scholarship is fragmented and adriftfrom mainstream sociology. This has two flow­on consequences; theresearch often overlooks theoretical advances within sociology and itcan also overlook something which constitutes sociology’s corebusiness, notions of power. The argument in favour of accidentologybecomes all the more pressing when we consider the social patterning ofaccidents (in terms of both their causes and consequences), and theirgrowing salience in our world in terms of their financial and socialcosts; the latter coming about because of their growing frequency andseverity. Social theorists have argued that we now dwell in the era of thegeneralized accident (Virilio, 2003), that the risks and dangers inherentin technological development and use drive the motor of social change(Beck, 1997, p. 23), that contemporary life is its own disaster movie(Baudrillard, 1994, p. 40) and that the shared fear of catastrophe is whatnow coheres us (Žižek, 2008, p. 79). By Virilio’s reckoning weanticipated war between the nineteenth and twentieth century. Betweenthe twentieth and the twenty first century we anticipated revolution.Now we anxiously await the accident (Lotringer & Virilio, 2005, p. 81). Far from seeing accidents as a string of meaningless aberrations oursurvey has given substance to Virilio’s call for an accidentology, alertingus to a range of reasons why they might warrant our attention. Accidentsand disasters are events and conditions which illuminate our times. Theydraw attention to systemic things which would otherwise pass unseen,revealing social order and everyday reality. Accidents and disastersforce us to re­examine common­sense assumptions about complexity,control, discovery, expertise, predictability, progress and risk. In sodoing they place social arrangements, expert and political decisions andtechnological choices into sharp relief. They have the potential to reveal
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the substance and the agency of technology, the frailty of ourorganisational matrices, the structural violence of our social systems andthe mobilisation of bias therein. Time, then, to develop a solid sociologyof them.
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